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WHEN COWS HAVE WINGS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE OECD'S TAX HAVEN WORK AS IT
RELATES TO GLOBALIZATION,
SOVEREIGNTY AND PRIVACY'
KIMBERLY CARLSON*

Over the last twenty years, startling advances in technology and the
telecommunications revolution have made it easier to access
offshore facilities - so much so, that today's offshore industry has
developed a major global business, spanning all quarters of the
world, involving, in one way or another, approximately half of the
world's financial transactions by value.
More than

150,000

offshore corporations

are formed

each

year.3 During the year 2000, around 80,000 offshore companies
were incorporated in the Caribbean islands alone.4

1. See JAMES DALE DAVIDSON & LORD WILLIAM REES-MOGG, THE
SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL: MASTERING THE TRANSITION TO THE INFORMATION
AGE 24 (Touchstone Books 1999) (1997) (stating that "[t]he state has grown
used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a
field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings.").
* B.S., Purdue University; J.D. The John Marshall Law School,
LL.M. in
International Business and Trade Law, The John Marshall Law School (June
2002). The author wishes to thank Michael P. Avramovich for encouraging
her to research the OECD's work and Erin Bedgood, Elizabeth Novy and Brian
Nielson for their assistance in preparing this Article for publication.
2. Finor Associates, Ltd., Tax Havens of the World: A Summary, at
http://www.fmor.org/entaxhavens history.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2002).
But see New Lease on Life for the Swiss Banquier Prive, INT'L MONEY MKTG.,
Aug. 6, 2001, at 21, available at 2001 WL 13947788 (disagreeing with the
capital impact of offshore banking). The Article stated that
[fiactors such as increased international coordination to curb tax evasion
and money laundering have created problems for these [offshore]
centres, and some industry estimates suggest that the level of assets
held offshore will halve by 2005. Some have gone so far as to suggest
that the moves made by the OECD, FATF and tax authorities will close
down offshore banking altogether.
Id.
3. See
Finor
Associates,
Ltd.,
supra
note
2,
at
http://www.finor.orglenltax havens history.htm
(defining
offshore
corporations as the "incorporation of offshore companies, opening of offshore
bank accounts and other offshore financial and asset protection services").
4. Id. St. Vincent and the Grenadines host roughly thirty-six banks even
though the population is only 120,000. Gregg Fields, Offshore Banks Escape
Sanctions, MIAMI HERALD, June 29, 2001, at 1C . Just imagine thirty-six
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This Article addresses the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development's (OECD) efforts to eliminate
competition from tax haven jurisdictions that offer multinationals
an opportunity to minimize taxes.5 Part I provides a factual
account of the OECD's work regarding tax havens. Part II
addresses how the OECD's actions will impede globalization in a
way which is inconsistent with the OECD's own statement in
support of globalization.
Part III discusses how the OECD
interferes with the fiscal sovereignty rights of other nations by
labeling them as tax havens. Part III also explains how the OECD

banks crowded into Naperville, Illinois... a suburb of Chicago boasting the
same population. Ten out of the thirty-two listed havens are in the Caribbean.
Id. The United States has owned the Caribbean financial tax havens since
World War II.
Werner RUgemer, Finance Havens Protect USA, DIE
TAGESZEITUNG (Francis Thanjan trans.) (issue date June 30, 2000) available
at http://www.gccforum.net/doc22-e.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002). Though
former President Clinton backed the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development's ("OECD") efforts to combat tax havens, President Bush
exerted pressure on the OECD regarding its requirements for the Caribbean
tax havens. Fields, supra. In response to American pressure, the OECD
agreed to delay the deadline for havens to pledge cooperation from July 31,
2001 to November 30, 2001. Id. The OECD also agreed to delay any punitive
measures against havens until the OECD Members enacted similar legislation
regarding bank secrecy and exchange of information. Id. While governments
in the Caribbean backed the fight against money laundering, "they balked at
helping rich countries fight tax evasion." Id. One reason was because OECD
Members, including the United States, contribute to tax evasion. Id. See also
William C. Caccamise, Jr., Note, U.S. Countermeasures Against Tax Haven
Countries, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 556, 561 (1988) (stating that the
United States lacked sufficient influence upon Caribbean nations and
elsewhere to negotiate information-sharing treaties); Ernest R. Larkins,
Multinationals and Their Quest for the Good Tax Haven: Taxes are One,
Albeit an Important, Consideration, 25 INT'L LAW. 471, 478 -79 (1991)
(examining the information exchange between the United States and the
Caribbean).
5. The OECD promotes policies that encourage stable financial expansion
of their member nations. See generally OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE, at 2 (1998) [hereinafter OECD, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION] (stating the purposes of the OECD).
A multinational
corporation is a corporation engaged in commercial activity "outside the
country of origin" and is financially dependent upon such foreign operations.
Jed Greer & Kavaljit Singh, A Brief History of TNC's (1995) (unpublished
Article, on file with The John Marshall Law Review). Greer and Singh add
that a transnational corporation generally manages their commercial
activities based upon "regional or global" influences. Id. Although Greer and
Singh's Article is clearly biased against corporations, they do provide
references for their claims. Id. Domestic and international taxation can be
understood with general background information written in simplified
language. See, e.g., John Volpe, George Mason University, Tax Lecture (Nov.
9, 1998), at http://mason.gmu.edu/-jvolpe/taxlecture.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2002) (discussing how multinational corporations are taxed). Volpe provides a
general explanation of such concepts as foreign sales corporations, the
alternative minimum tax, the foreign tax credit and transfer pricing. Id.
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fails to consider the interests of these tax haven jurisdictions when
the OECD makes recommendations and encourages other
jurisdictions to coordinate defensive measures against such tax
haven nations. Part IV discusses the need for investor privacy as
weighed against the need to combat criminal actions. Part V
proposes a global forum to best address tax haven issues so that
developing nations maintain their sovereign independence.6
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE

OECD's WORK TO

COMBAT TAX

COMPETITION

In 1998, the OECD published a report entitled Harmful Tax
Competition - An Emerging Global Issue.7 The report establishes
criteria to identify tax havens and recommends how to counteract
these preferential regimes by focusing solely on "geographically
mobile" capital in contrast to tax incentives to build factories.8
A tax haven is described as a country with no tax, or a low
effective tax rate. 9 Applying a subjective reputation test, a country
is considered a tax haven if it offers itself as a place to be used by
non-residents to escape taxes in their country of residence." Other
factors that define a tax haven include a lack of regulatory or
6. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, ET AL., supra note 1, at 129-32 (anticipating that

the information age will worsen the exploitation of undeveloped nations by
more powerful nations such as the United States).
7. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5. See also Sean D.
Murphy, OECD Listing of States for Unfair Tax Practices, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
677, 696-97 (2000) (describing the basis for the OECD's Harmful Tax
Competition report). But see Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The
OECD View, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 311, 314 (1999) (criticizing
key factors of the OECD report because it views a "multifaceted set of issues
from a unilateral perspective").
8. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 8, (stating that

"[t]ax incentives designed to attract investment in plant, building and
equipment have been excluded at this stage"). See also THEODORE H. MORAN,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW POLICY AGENDA
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 95-96 (Inst. for

Inst'l Econ. 1998) (observing that the countries are increasingly designing tax
programs to attract foreign investment income); Yitzhak Hadari, The Role of
Tax Incentives in Attracting Foreign Investments in Selected Developing
Countries and the DesirablePolicy, 24 INT'L L. 121, 122-23 (1990) (discussing

tax incentives generally).
9. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 21. See also
Larkins, supra note 4, at 483 (listing the "pure" no-tax countries as Andorra,

Anguilla, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Djibouti,
Nauru, Nevis, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu). Tax havens have
gained popularity because of the information and technology explosion over
the last two decades.
Finor Associates, Ltd., supra note 2, at
http://www.finor.org/en/tax.havens-history.htm.
10. Id. See also OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 21-24
(referring to the reputation criterion as one "without any objective basis").
OECD Member Luxembourg abstained from adopting this report due in part
to application of the reputation test. Id. at 74-75.
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administrative constraints and the limited exchange of
information due to bank secrecy provisions."
The last factor
considered is whether the tax haven country lacks a requirement
for "substantial activity.""2 The absence of a substantial activity
requirement "suggests that a jurisdiction may be attempting to
attract investment and transactions that are purely tax driven." 3
Though these criteria identified tax havens, the OECD did not
intend to publish a list of tax havens until the year 2000.'
To defend against the harm that tax havens caused, the
OECD proceeded to make three categories of recommendations."

11. Id. at 21-24.

12. See id. at 22-24 (suggesting it is important that "the activity be
substantial"). "Ring fencing" is another method that various nations use to
protect their own economies. Id. at 26-27. Ring fencing occurs when the tax
haven nation forbids an investor to enter their "domestic market" or forbids
their own residents from benefiting from any economic investment in their
nation. Id. Numerous multinational subsidiaries are merely a wall plaque
and an address. See J.W. SMITH, THE WORLD'S WASTED WEALTH 2 138 (Inst.
for Econ. Democracy 1994) (referring to the 11,000 corporations registered in
the Cayman Islands which has a population of only 10,000). Some tax havens,
by offering free trade zones, encourage a physical presence as well. See Finor
Associates,
Ltd.,
supra
note
2,
at
http://www.finor.org/en/tax havens-history.htm. Mauritius, for example, has
in excess of 700 companies physically based in its Export Processing Zone. See
id., at http://www.finor.org/en/taxhavenshiistory.htm (referring to the Isle of
Man and Madeira as well).
13. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 24. It is
unrealistic to think that multinationals only consider taxes when making
decisions. See Larkins, supra note 4, at 472-73 (1991) (listing the multiple
"ingredients" that influence a corporation's decision to invest with tax haven
countries). There are numerous non-tax considerations when a multinational
decides whether to make a foreign investment. See, e.g., OXFAM POLICY
PAPERS, Tax Havens - Releasing the Hidden Billions For Poverty Eradication,
The Impact of Financial Havens on Developing Countries-pt. 2, at
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/taxhvn/tax3.htm (June 2000) (listing
examples of attractions for foreign investment including "large markets,
natural resources, development infrastructure, a relatively cheap and efficient
labour force, macro-economic stability and liberal trade regimes"); Hadari,
supra note 8, at 122-23 (same). This is not to de-emphasize the powerful lure
of a nominal tax rate. See, e.g., JAMES R. HINES, JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 2 (2000) (classifying non-tax
considerations as secondary because "countries with lower tax rates receive
much more foreign direct investment than do countries with higher tax
rates.").
14. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, REPORT TO THE 2000
MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE
ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL

TAX PRACTICES 17 (2000) [hereinafter OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX COOPERATION] (listing all thirty-five jurisdictions that the OECD identifies as
tax havens).
15. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 39. Tax havens
prefer nations to first apply their own defensive measures rather than the
designated tax haven because the administrative burden will rest with the
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The first set of recommendations concerns how to make current
domestic defensive legislation more effective. 6 The second set of
recommendations concerns tax treaties and the third emphasizes
the need for international cooperation
and calls for nations to act
17
collectively against tax competition.
On the home front, countries are encouraged to apply their
domestic laws concerning Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs)
in a way that curbs harmful tax practices. 8 Regarding exemptions
country that stands to benefit from increased tax revenue.

Position Statement, Pacific Islands Forum, to the OECD,

See Regional

2 (Apr. 28, 2002),

available at http://www.forumsec.org.f/news/2001/aprl3.htm (last visited Feb.
18, 2002) [hereinafter Pacific Islands Forum] (encouraging nations to first
apply defensive measures). Taiwan defends against tax haven abuse using
complex but largely ineffective measures. See Connie Guang-Hwa Yang, Note,
Taiwan's Control of the Tax Sheltering Use of Tax Haven Base Companies:
Substance Over Form Rule or Subpart F-Type Legislation?, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 231, 251-58, 268 (1993) (analyzing the effectiveness of Taiwan's
"substance over form" rule as compared to legislation that resembles I.R.C. §§
951-64 (Subpart F) of the United States Tax Code).
16. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 39. See also
Caccamise, Jr., supra note 4, at 554 (advocating "judicial sanctions to enforce
compliance with discovery orders" because the United States can then obtain
enhanced information about offshore accounts); Kurt A. Wagner, U.S.
Taxation of Foreign Income: The Use of Tax Havens in a Changing Tax
Environment, 18 S.ILL. U. L.J. 617, 633-34 (1994) (suggesting that the United
States' recent tax haven proposals are complicated regulations but increase
tax revenue).
17. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 39. The United
States follows the "residence" principle. Ninth meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on InternationalCooperation in Tax Matters: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. ESCOR, 1999 Sess., 9th mtg., Agenda Item 13 (j), 34, n.3,
U.N. Doc. E/1999/84 (1999) [hereinafter UN Ninth Meeting]. The "residence"
or "worldwide" principle taxes corporations and persons on their income
earned both domestically and outside their jurisdictional borders. Id.; JANICE
C. SHIELDS, INTERHEMISPHERIC RES. CTR. AND INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, 3
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 1, No. 1, TAXING OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS (Jan.
1998), available at http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol3/liftax.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2002).
Other nations, such as Switzerland and Argentina, follow the
"territorial" or "source" principle, which taxes all income earned from sources
within its jurisdiction. See UN Ninth Meeting, supra, T1 34, n.2 (defining
'source" principle); Shields, supra (referring to the same principle as the
"territorial" principle). This causes multinationals to be taxed twice, which is
unfair at times. Shields, supra. To combat this problem, the United States
provides various credits and negotiates tax treaties with other countries. Id.
The United States currently has such treaties with forty-seven countries. Id.
18. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 41-42
(indicating there are fourteen OECD Members with CFC legislation). A
corporation is a CFC if "U.S. shareholders own more than 50 percent of its
outstanding voting stock, or more than 50 percent of the value of all its
outstanding stock.., on any day during the foreign corporation's tax year."
See SARAH E. NUTTER, IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, CONTROLLED
FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS,
1996
134
(Spring
2001)
available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/96cfcart.pdf
(last visited Feb. 17,
2002)
(providing an excellent explanation and statistical analysis of CFCs). See also
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of foreign income, the OECD recommends eliminating exemptions
based on the countries from which the foreign income is earned,
the type of income, or the rate at which the income is taxed in the
foreign jurisdiction. 9
Tax authorities need information to effectively enforce the tax
system. ° Therefore, the OECD encourages countries to adopt
foreign information reporting rules regarding the international
transactions and foreign operations of resident taxpayers. 21 The
OECD recommends that countries publish their conditions for
granting pre-tax administrative decisions for greater transparency
2
to permit equal treatment among similarly situated taxpayers.
Eric T. Laity, The United States' Response to Tax Havens: The Foreign Base
Company Services Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations,18 NW. J. INT'L
L. & BuS. 1, 3 (1997) (detailing a study of foreign base company service
income); SARAH E. NUTTER, IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, STATISTICS
OF INCOME STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME AND TAXES 151 (Winter
1998/1999) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/intstart.pdf (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002) (providing an overview of income statistic studies that used
available international information); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FOREIGN- AND U.S.- CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS THAT DID NOT PAY U.S. INCOME TAXES, 1989-95 4, No.
GAO/GGD-99-39 (1999) (considering CFCs a defensive tactic because an owner
must report as gross income his or her respective share of the CFC's income);
Caccamise, Jr., supra note 4, at 558-59 (same).
19. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 43. To some
extent, the United States already does this. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 17,
at 3 (stating that "Congress has attempted to reduce tax avoidance benefits of
shifting income to tax havens by establishing a list of types of income (such as
interest revenue or shipping profits) that may not be deferred from U.S.
taxation....").
20. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 43-44.
21. Id. See also OECD Model Tax Convention, Apr. 29, 2000, art. 26 (1997)
(stating that the basis for information exchange is to benefit member nations).
For example, some Canadian provinces are seeking to gain information. See
Theresa Tedesco, OSC Won't Lead Way in Offshore Crackdown: 'We Will Not
Put Our Industry at a Disadvantage',FIN. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at 1, available
at 2001 WL 28026552 (citing the three Canadian provinces of British
Columbia, Alberta and Quebec that compelled their brokerage firms to list all
open accounts in the OECD blacklisted tax havens and to ultimately
determine the beneficial owners of these accounts).
22. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 44-45. See also
OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (1995) [hereinafter OECD, TRANSFER PRICING
GUIDELINES] (providing the OECD's transfer pricing guidelines). To assist
corporations in determining transfer pricing which will be considered
acceptable by the tax authority, the IRS, among other nations' tax authorities,
offers Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs). VOLPE, supra note 5. Some APAs
take six to nine months to develop. Id. See also Senator Byron Dorgan, How
Corporations Operate Tax Free, 32 WASHINGTON MONTHLY 34-35 (July/Aug.
2000) (viewing transfer pricing as a way for multinationals to negotiate their
own tax bills). "An [APA] determines, in advance of controlled transactions,
an appropriate set of indicators .

. . ,

critical assumptions as to future events

for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed
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"More than two-thirds of world trade involves at least one
multinational, half of which occurs within the same multinational
around the world."23 When trade occurs within a multinational,
the corporation uses a concept called transfer pricing to allocate
costs between the subdivisions.2 ' To prevent shell paper-based

period of time." UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, T 26. This is not to be
confused with safe harbors, a process whereby a multinational may follow a
set of rules under which transfer prices would be acceptable. Id.9 28. This
method was discouraged because of the potential for "tax arbitrage" and
"double taxation." Id. In spite of funds diverted to promote the APA program,
as of 1995, APAs were used infrequently and when they were used, the APAs
often determined the transfer price by a pricing method not described in
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. See UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: TRANSFER PRICING AND
INFORMATION ON NONPAYMENT OF TAX 3, No. GAO/GGD-95-101 (1995)

[hereinafter GAO/GGD-95-1011 (referring to uncontrolled price, cost plus and
resale price as the three described in the Code); UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
INFORMATION ON IRS'
INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES 1, No. GAO/GGD-94-96FS
(1994) (reporting the IRS' efforts to expand the APA program).
23. MYRIAM VANDER STICHELE, TRANSNATIONAL INST., TOWARDS A WORLD
TRANSNATIONALS' ORGANISATION?, (WTO Booklet Series No. 3, 1998),
available at http://www.tni.org/pubs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
See also Greer & Singh, supra note 5 (stating that "[bly the 1960's an
estimated one-third of world trade was intra-company in nature, a proportion
which has remained steady to the present day ...[but] [t]he absolute level
and value of intra-company trade has increased considerably since that
time.").
24. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at P-3. See also
Robert S. McIntyre, Taxing Multinational Corporations, Citizens for Tax
Justice, at http://www.ctj.orgfhtml/mnc.htm (Mar. 1998) [hereinafter
McIntyre, Taxing Multinational Corporations] (providing a simplified
explanation of transfer pricing); Robert S. McIntyre, The Hidden Entitlements,
Tax Breaks for Multinational Corporations, Citizens for Tax Justice, at
http://www.ctj.org/hid-ent/part-2/part2-3.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002)
[hereinafter McIntyre, The Hidden Entitlements] (explaining that
multinationals "transfer prices" to shift income away from the United States
and shift deductible expenses into the United States). Transfer pricing is a
legal means by which multinationals decrease their tax liability. McIntyre,
The Hidden Entitlements, at http://www.ctj.org/hid-ent/part-2/part2-3.htm.
The goal of every multinational is to maximize shareholder value. See Michael
Avramovich, Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under Internal
Revenue Code Section 482: The Noose Tightens on MultinationalCorporations,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915, 929 (1995) (explaining how multinationals
legitimately use transfer pricing to maximize shareholder value).
Multinationals do this by maximizing profits in low or no tax jurisdictions and
minimizing profit or maximizing expenses in high tax jurisdictions such as the
United States. Id. See also Dorgan, supra note 22, at 35 (stating that "[i]t
takes the money out of one pocket-its operations in the U.S.-and puts it into
another, which is its operations abroad."). A corporation may purchase items
from a subsidiary located in a tax haven. GAO/GGD-95-101, supra note 22, at
2. Transfer pricing not only relates to tangible goods but to services, such as
royalty payments. Id. at 1. The corporation will not be taxed on the profits
made in that country so the subsidiary could charge the United States-based
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operations, the OECD recommends countries follow its 1995
Transfer Pricing Guidelines that only permit "arm's length"
transactions."
The last recommendation involving domestic legislation
involves bank secrecy. 6 Countries are encouraged to permit tax
authorities to have access to banking information by eliminating
impediments to such information. 7
The second set of recommendations relates to tax treaties. 8

parent corporation a high price and thus make a huge profit. Id. at 1-2. In
some cases, prices are overly inflated. Id. For example, disposable plastic
gloves sold for $46.22 a piece, ballpoint pens for $8,500, apple juice at $2,052
per liter and, my personal favorite, wrist watch batteries were sold to the
parent for the bargain price of $8,252 each. Dorgan, supra note 22, at 33-35.
This "overcharging" serves the parent well because having to purchase those
products at such a high price leads to a loss (on paper) in the United States
which prevents the corporation from having to pay taxes on any profit. See,
e.g., McIntyre, Taxing Multinational Corporations,supra note 24 (providing
examples of corporations including IBM, Schering-Plough and Prime
Computer which utilized tax havens such as Ireland and Puerto Rico to inflate
their foreign taxes and minimize American taxes). This is not to say that all
corporations participate in abusive transfer pricing schemes. GAO/GGD-95101, supra note 22, at 3 (acknowledging that the differences in tax payment
rates between foreign corporations and domestic operations was not
convincing evidence of transfer pricing abuse).
25. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 45 (citing OECD,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES). The arm's length principle provides that
transfers between related companies must be made as if the companies were
strangers to each other. Id. See also McIntyre, Taxing Multinational
Corporations, supra note 24 (describing how multinationals evade United
States taxes when they inform the IRS that they earned their taxable income
overseas). This method is considered unrealistic because corporations set up
subsidiaries to avoid having to deal at an arm's length. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S.
InternationalTaxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 148 (1995). In theory, the effect is
to make the price paid for products internally reflect a reasonable market
price and not an inflated price. Id. at 94. In practice, however, the process of
sifting through transactions to determine the arm's length price has been
referred to as "trying to disentangle a vat of spaghetti with a toothpick."
Dorgan, supra note 22, at 35. Developing countries find the arm's length
principle especially hard to apply due to lack of similar goods and comparable
prices. UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, 26.
26. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 45-46. See
Caccamise, Jr., supra note 4, at 557 (discussing the United States Bank
Secrecy Act).
27. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 45.
28. Id. at 46-52. Tax treaties are considered to solve double taxation
problems and to promote orderly international tax relationships. UN Ninth
Meeting, supra note 17,
33. Sometimes, however, income is not taxable
anywhere due to tax treaties. See McIntyre, The Hidden Entitlements, supra
note 24 (referring to a case which Intel Corporation won in United States Tax
Court and was permitted to treat millions of dollars in profits as Japanese
income). Intel's profits came from selling American-made chips, but a tax
treaty required Japan to exempt these American profits from tax. Id.
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The OECD recommendations encourage nations to "intensify
exchange of relevant information concerning transactions in tax
havens" and "restrict the entitlement to treaty benefits for entities
and income covered by measures constituting harmful tax
practices," and to clarify "the status of domestic anti-abuse rules
and doctrines in tax treaties. " '9 Furthermore, countries are
encouraged to terminate their tax treaties with tax havens and to
coordinate enforcement programs. 0
Finally, countries are
encouraged to assist in the recovery of tax claims from other
countries."
In its final set of recommendations, the OECD emphasized
the need for international cooperation in response to harmful tax
competition.32 To assist in coordinated defense measures, the
29. OECD,HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 46-49. To gain

greater consistency in the use of exclusion provisions, the OECD committed
itself to developing a list of exclusion provisions to be used when negotiating
tax treaties. Id. at 49.
30. Id. at 49-51. The United States has done this. See, e.g., BALTIC
BANKING GROUP, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS:
TAX
PLANNING,
(1999),
at
http://www.balticbankinggroup.com/fundamentals/tax-planning.html
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter BALTIC BANKING GROUP] (commenting that
the IRS recently disregarded several "international tax planning" treaties to
crack down on tax-free tax planning). The article qualified the IRS action that
threw out the treaties with the Netherlands, Antilles and the British Virgin
Islands because the United States is re-negotiating treaties with these
countries. Id. This makes "exchange of information" sections in unilateral tax
treaties inapplicable to tax havens because the tax haven jurisdictions will
continue to limit a state's ability to obtain the desired information.
Caccamise, Jr., supra note 4, at 556; UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, 14.
31. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 52. The UN
commented:
[T]he effort to increase collaboration encounters several difficulties
which perceptibly limit States' ability to take action to meet the new
challenges of globalization.
First, many States are reluctant to
relinquish part of the information obtained in the exercise of their
administrative authority and powers within their territory, while some
States decline to seek such information from their taxpayers. Second,
there is a lack of mutual interest on the part of both States in gathering
and providing information. It is considered that tax-planning schemes
designed to reduce the tax burden in a State utilize the legal
mechanisms provided for in another State (or other States) either
unilaterally or in conjunction with the application of a double-taxation
convention, so that it is unlikely that the other State will have an equal
interest in providing the information.
UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, 14.
32. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 52. The challenge
is to get all States to cooperate at the same time. See, e.g., OXFAM POLICY
PAPERS, supra note 13 (emphasizing the need for a multilateral approach to
prevent bad behavior from "shift[ing] to the next weakest link in the chain").
See also Tedesco, supra note 21, at 1 (indicating that Canadian investment
dealers "could lose a substantial part of their $20-billion a year in business
from offshore accounts if they are forced to comply with the tougher client
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OECD committed to developing a list of tax havens by the year
2000 that was based on their specified criteria.3 Countries are
encouraged to ensure that economic or political ties with the listed
countries are not used to encourage harmful tax practices.3 To
promote
voluntary
compliance
with
the
1998
report
recommendation, the OECD committed to having a dialogue with
non-member countries.5 It also committed to promoting principles
of good tax administration regarding the enforcement of the
Report's recommendations .
II. THE OECD's EFFECT ON GLOBALIZATION
The issue is whether the OECD's attempt to combat tax
havens supports globalization. The OECD is occasionally referred
to as "tax haven haters," "tiberbureaucrats" or the "Parisian
monstrosity," and thus, is not without its critics.37 Deroy Murdock
wrote for the NationalReview Online:
The OECD scheme would encourage the world's major economies to
penalize 41 low-tax countries and territories for maintaining
attractively low rates unless they essentially relinquish their fiscal
sovereignty. It also would institutionalize the exchange of financial
information across international borders to help tax authorities
chase their citizens' assets around the globe. 38
This common criticism touches upon the concepts of globalization,
sovereignty and privacy.
Each concept will be addressed
respectively.
Globalization is considered the "march of international
capitalism." 39 A hallmark of capitalism is competition, and since a
majority of the highest-taxing nations collaborated to stomp out
lower tax alternatives, the OECD's work to combat tax havens is
identification policy and brokers elsewhere are not"). A Canadian industry
official remarked, "[i]f it isn't the same everywhere, all that'll happen is that
the business will leave Canada and go somewhere else." Id.
33. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 57.

34. Id. at 57-58.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id.
37. See Michael Lynch, Tax Haven Haters: The OECD's Hypocritical
Campaign Against Low-Tax Countries, REASON ONLINE, (May 3, 2001), at
http://reason.com/ml/mlO5030l.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) (speaking of
the OECD's campaign against tax havens as "blatant hypocrisy"); Ilana
Mercer, The War on Tax Havens, at http://www.ilanamercer.contaxhaven.htm

(Sept. 10, 2001) (speaking of "uberbureaucrats" at the OECD); Deroy Murdock,
of the Global Tax Police, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/murdock/murdock042301.shtml
(Apr.
23,
2001) (speaking of the "Parisian monstrosity").
38. Murdock, supra note 37.

Attack

39. Udayan Roy, A Survey of Globalisation:Globalisation and its Critics,

Sept. 29, 2001, at 3. Globalization has also been referred to as a
"business driven phenomenon." Stichele, supra note 23.
ECONOMIST,
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against globalization." After all, the OECD Members constitute
twenty-nine countries, none of which are considered tax havens.41
The OECD addresses globalization in a way which sounds
very positive:
The OECD believes that the progressive liberalisation of crossborder trade and investment has been the single most powerful
driving force behind economic growth and rising living standards.
The Organisation seeks to safeguard and promote an open,
multilateral trading system and to encourage adjustments to that
system to take into account the changing nature of international
trade, including the interface between trade, investment and
taxation. The Committee believes that the proposals set out in this
Report, although not covering all aspects of tax competition, will
further promote these objectives by reducing the distortionary
influence on taxation on the location of mobile financial and service
activities, thereby promoting fair competition for real economic
activities. If governments can agree that these location decisions
should be driven by economic considerations and not primarily by
tax factors, this will help move towards the "level playing field"
which is so essential to the continued expansion of global economic
growth. 2

40. See Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 7 (1996), available at
http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/Top-200.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2002)
(commenting that "[als citizen movements the world over launch activities to
counter aspects of economic globalization, the growing power of private
corporations is becoming a central issue."). See also Stichele, supra note 23.
Combating tax havens pleases anti-corporation groups who are against
globalization for fear of increasing multinationals' power and influence. Dr.
Michael Hudson, Globalized Economy and Recapture of Rent, THE PROGRESS
REPORT, at http://www.progress.org/cglrecaptOO.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002).
The task is not only to attack globalization, it is to show the way out, to
propose a policy alternative, a counter-strategy. There is such a thing
as market socialism. Governments can shape the market to encourage
productive investment, and tax away what is parasitic ....
The kind of
globalization we have seen since 1980 has been primarily parasitic. It is
like a tumor, a tapeworm on the economic organism, not the organism
itself.
Id.
41. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 3. In alphabetical
order, the original Members of the OECD include Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 2. Later joining nations
include Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand and Poland. Id.
42. Id. at 8-9. See also UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, 3 (highlighting
the integrated nature of this global problem). "It cannot be emphasised too
strongly that tax haven problems cannot be divorced from the taxation of
international transactions in general, or from non-tax policy concerns."
BALTIC BANKING GROUP, supra note 30. The problem is made more
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What could be "real economic activities"? "The Top 200
corporations' sales are growing at a faster rate than overall global
economic activity. Between 1983 and 1999, their combined sales
grew from the equivalent of 25.0 % to 27.5 % of World GDP.""
That appears real to me. By using offshore centers, multinationals
are able to maintain a competitive edge." In fact, if the OECD
were successful, it would not "promote fair competition" but rather
hinder it.4"
The continuing existence of tax havens, however, may cause
substantial repercussions. "If economic integration allows capital
and skills to migrate to low-tax jurisdictions, the tax base will
shrink. Governments will find themselves unable to finance social
programmes, safety nets or redistribution of income."46 For this
reason, tax policy is not just domestic, but rather considers the
effects of foreign tax policies and how to counter those effects.47
While there is an argument to be made for a level playing field,
what exactly does that mean in terms of tax competition? Critic
Paul Jacob says the following:
[The OECD wants] the countries of the world to join hands and tax
everybody at the same rate, the same way. Form a kind of global
tax cartel. It's a blatant bid to eliminate tax competition between
nations. If the goal were ever accomplished - or even roughly

complicated by the need to consider competing policy objectives such as
maintaining the competitiveness of overseas business investments, taxing
foreign investment fairly, promoting investment in the developed country or
making sure the system is administratively efficient. Id.
43. Anderson & Cavanagh, supra note 40, at 3.
44. Finor Associates, Ltd., supra note 2 (commenting that "[situdies show
that lower tax regimes allow multinational companies to offer their products
in all nations at more competitive prices than would otherwise be possible if
not for the ability of these companies to operate in lower tax environments.").
Those who do not trust corporations put it another way. See, e.g., OXFAM
POLICY PAPERS, supra note 13 (describing the impact of financial havens on
developing countries as "[t]hose TNCs willing to exploit the opportunities for
international tax avoidance can gain a significant advantage of domestic
competitors and small and medium sized enterprises.").
45. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 9.
46. Roy, supra note 39, at 15. See also Fields, supra note 4 (quoting the
director of financial, fiscal and enterprise at the OECD William Witherell:
"[r]ampant tax evasion is a threat to the treasuries and democratic
foundations of every nation").
47. Hines, Jr., supra note 13, at 1.
The ability and evident willingness of taxpayers to relocate activity, to
shift taxable income between jurisdictions, and to respond to incentives
created by the interaction of domestic and foreign tax rules, mean that
the tax policies of other countries obviously must be considered in the
formulation of domestic policy. In the current environment, almost
every U.S. tax provision influences foreign direct investment (FDI) or
provides incentives for international tax avoidance.

2002]

When Cows Have Wings

approximated - it would be a disaster for the world's taxpayers.4
The elimination of all tax competition would be harmful
indeed. Competition denotes alternatives and alternatives give
multinationals the opportunity to leave and take their
investments with them.49
This opportunity to leave prevents
governments from being tyrants. ° One must consider that the
highest taxing governments in the world are trying to eliminate
this competition.51
The OECD makes it clear that establishing a standard tax
rate is not its intent. For example, one OECD report stated that
"[tihe project is not primarily about collecting taxes and is not
intended to promote the harmonization of income taxes or tax
structures generally within or outside the OECD, nor is it about
dictating to any country what should be the appropriate level of
tax rates."52 The emphasis must be on the qualifier "primarily,"
otherwise, collecting taxes and dictating an appropriate level of
tax rates appears to be exactly what the OECD is attempting to
accomplish. "3 For example, the recommendations on transparency

48. Paul Jacob, Taxpayers Unite! (U.S. Term Limits Daily Radio
Commentary
No.
389,
June
25,
2001),
available
at
http://www.termlimits.org/press/commonsense/cs389.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2002).
49. Roy, supra note 39, at 15. See also OXFAM POLICY PAPERS, supra note
13 (commenting that "[tihe internationally integrated nature of TNCs allows
them to choose between locations according to the different tax regimes or
other benefits on offer.").
50. Roy, supra note 39, at 15. See also OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION
(statement by Switzerland), supra note 5, at 76 (stating that "competition in
tax matters has positive effects ... it discourages governments from adopting
confiscatory regimes, which hamper entrepreneurial spirit and hurt the
economy, and it avoids alignment of tax burdens at the highest level."). The
effect of tax competition is explained:
Tax competition, like any competition, disciplines governments. The
U.S.' tax cuts of the 1980s kept taxes lower in Europe than they
otherwise would have been, just as Virginia's lower taxes puts pressure
on neighboring Maryland and the District of Columbia. The United
States is a giant free-trade zone in which states compete as tax
jurisdictions; we've all benefited from it.
Lynch, supra note 37. If one country does something, other countries have to
follow suit so as not to lose foreign direct investments. For example:
Since the US move to abolish the withholding tax on foreign residents
earning interest income on portfolio investments in 1984, no other major
economy has been able to maintain a withholding tax for fear of losing
out on foreign investments ... [i]n all countries the fear that money
would shift elsewhere makes unilateral moves to tax interest income
impossible.
OXFAM POLICY PAPERS, supra note 13. The United States' action has led it to
be called "the largest tax haven in the world." Lynch, supra note 37.
51. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, $ 2.
52. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 14, at 5.
53. Id.
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are designed to ease the collection of taxes by tax authorities. 54
Consider also the criteria that identify a country as a tax haven
primarily based on no tax rate or a very low effective tax rate. By
encouraging defensive measures against these countries, the
OECD is effectively dictating to tax havens that their tax rate
levels are inappropriate." The OECD continued:
Rather, the project is about ensuring that the burden of taxation is
fairly shared and that tax should not be the dominant factor in
making capital allocation decisions. The project is focused on the
concerns of OECD and non-OECD countries, which are exposed to
significant revenue losses as a result of harmful tax competition."
The Economist, recognizing the mobility of capital and its
effect of competition, states:
So far this competition has affected the structure of tax codes rather
than overall tax burdens; total yields have been unaffected. In an
effort to attract inflows of capital, and especially inflows of foreign
direct investment, governments have been lowering their tax rates
for corporate income and raising them for personal income, or
relying more on a variety of indirect taxes, or both. 7
While The Economists' conclusion somewhat defeats the OECD's
concern of "significant revenue losses" based upon tax rate, this
conclusion may not be accurate. 58
In 1998, the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated that the United States Treasury would lose ten billion
dollars in revenue due to tax breaks offered to multinational
corporations. 9 Foreign sales corporations would cause a loss of
$1.6 billion dollars and transfer pricing would add another twelve
to fifty billion dollars to the significant revenue losses. ° This
54. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 24 (explaining
that information exchange would simplify tax calculation).
55. Id. at 77 (statement by Switzerland) (using tax rates as a criterion to
identify tax havens "results in an unacceptable protection of countries with
high levels of taxation").
56. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 14, at 5. This

tax competition may be causing developing countries to forego tax revenues of
at least $50 billion per year. OXFAM POLICY PAPERS, supra note 13. See also
Evasion of Responsibilities and Dues, Global Issues that Affect Europe, at

http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Corporations/Evasion.asp
(last
visited Nov. 27, 2001) (recognizing the reality that poorer countries do not
have any alternative but to lower or eliminate taxes for corporations
threatening to leave).
57. Roy, supra note 39, at 16.
58. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 14, at 5.
59. Shields, supra note 17, at 2.

60. Id. By some estimates, transfer pricing cost the United States $43
billion dollars in 1999 alone, more than $117 million dollars a day. See
Dorgan, supra note 22, at 35 (referring to Professors Simon Pak and John
Zdanowicz who based their transfer pricing estimates upon examination of
customs receipts). Offshore export companies cost the United States billions of
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would only support the OECD's position if the United States
suffered these losses as a result of harmful tax competition. After
all, low or no tax jurisdictions are what make transfer pricing both
possible and profitable.
However, these tax breaks appear to be offered more out of
freewill than out of a forced response to maintain the United
As stated in The
States' premiere competitive position.6'
Economist, the United States is merely lowering its tax rates for
multinational corporations to stimulate foreign direct investment
and raising them for personal income." This is supported by the
fact that only twelve percent of income generated from taxes was
from corporations, compared to a full forty-four percent which
came from individual income taxes. 3

III. THE OECD's VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY
All globalization leads to a sacrifice of some sovereignty.64

dollars annually:
In accordance with the Foreign Sales Corporation Act (FSC), US firms
are free to carry out their export business via mailbox companies on the
Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Barbados,
Guam and certain other centres. This results in a tax reduction of about
65 percent... According to EU information, currently half of all US
exports in the order of some 125 billion US dollars enjoy rebates in this
way. The US Federal Budget for 2001 envisages an indirect subvention
of 4.1 billion dollars for this purpose.
RUgemer, supra note 4. Boeing, Microsoft and GM are cited as examples of
multinationals which took advantage of the Foreign Sales Corporation status
to get a tax exemption for exports generated offshore. Michael Paulson, WTO
Case File: ForeignSales Corporations,available at
http://seattlep-i.nwsource.com/national/case4.shtml (last visited Nov. 22,
2001). The WTO held the FSC to be an illegal export subsidy. Id.
61. The United States offers five ways for international investors to reduce
taxes estimated to provide $19,100 million dollars in benefits. Janice C.
Shields, Corporate Welfare and Foreign Policy, THE PROGRESS REPORT, at
(last visited
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/cw/index-body.html
Nov. 27, 2001) (combining the following tax breaks: inventory property sales
source rule exception, foreign sales corporations, tax deferral of income of
controlled foreign corporations, transfer pricing, and lack of a minimum tax on
foreign-owned businesses). The OECD has been criticized for not taking these
tax competitive features into account. Brown, supra note 7, at 313.
62. Roy, supra note 39, at 9.
63. Shields, supra note 17, at 1. To the individual feeling the burden of
taxes, this statistic considered alone seems unfair. However, consider the
argument in The Economist which states that "heavy reliance on corporate
Roy, supra note 39, at 16.
taxes is bad policy ....
4 (recognizing the likelihood
64. See UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17,
that the increased need for international tax cooperation will risk fiscal
sovereignty). The UN recognized that the "new economic situation requires a
reappraisal of the State's position in the exercise of its powers of taxation,
which in turn necessitates abandoning the concept of exercise of sovereignty,
with attendant consequences." Id. T 11.
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Any sovereignty that is lost by signing worldwide trade
agreements, however, is tolerable because it is only forfeited after
an opportunity to negotiate. 5 By excluding non-OECD members
in the analysis and by recommending coordinated defense
measures, the OECD violates the sovereignty of those nations that
it unilaterally deems tax havens. 66 "It is uncivil, not to mention
coercive, for the OECD to force tax havens to prostrate their laws
before those of the aggressor governments."67
Every nation has a right to operate its own tax regimes and
should not need to put its economy, which is primarily based on
the offshore investment market, at risk to ensure that taxing
giants maintain their imprisoned tax base. 68 Even the OECD
admits that a nation's economy could be detrimentally affected if it
reforms the OECD-way to get off the tax haven blacklist.69 As an
example, the economies of the Pacific Islands will be negatively
affected by the OECD's proposal because it maintains the current
The Pacific
Forum
met 7with
the OECD to
status
'
their concerns
and Islands
to address
this issue.
expressquo.7

65. See Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, T 5 (arguing that affected
nations should fully participate in more than mere "dialogue... to fully
achieve multilateralisation" because it could "divide the concerted efforts of
affected nations to achieve a consistent dialogue with the OECD").
66. See, e.g., OXFAM POLICY PAPERS, supra note 13 (emphasizing the need
for developing countries [tax havens] to be involved in discussions from the
beginning). See also Brown, supra note 7, at 314 (5) (commenting that
multinational corporations ultimately shape both tax laws and capital
investments because they desire to minimize their tax rates when tax haven
nations are not included in such tax law discussions).
67. Mercer, supra note 37.
68. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, 3. Conversely, nations have a
right to require information regarding investors using brokers within the
state's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tedesco, supra note 21, at 1 (quoting a Canadian
securities official who believed it unacceptable for entities to hide behind the
The Canadian securities official
secrecy laws of foreign countries).
rationalized:
It is not illegal to deal with privacy jurisdictions. What you can't say is
that the rules won't allow brokerages to ask important questions. Our
view is that if they are operating in this jurisdiction, trading in stocks
through a Canadian broker, on a Canadian stock exchange, the fact is
they have to comply with the rules here.
Id.
69.

OECD,

TOWARD GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 14, at 7.

Because tax incentives attract foreign investment, some countries make
legislative changes to intentionally become tax havens. See, e.g., Walid
Nasser, Transforming Lebanon into a Tax Haven, 18 MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REP.

8, 15-16 (Aug. 1995) (describing the changes Lebanon made to its tax system
to attract offshore companies).
70. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, 2. The Pacific Islands Forum
has seven nation members: Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Republic of Marshall
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Id.
71. See id. (stating that the GDP of Australia is $300 billion dollars,
compared to the Pacific Forum nations' GDP of only $1 billion dollars). Prior
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The Pacific Islands feel powerless against the OECD.72 All
seven of the listed Pacific Islands have a combined gross domestic
product less than that of Australia." As a result, they "do not have
the resources of the OECD Members to address the issue of
harmful tax competition." 74 Income from offshore centers in these
countries can amount to eight to ten percent of their GDP.75 These
factors contribute to one-sided negotiations, not the open
"dialogue" that the OECD portrays.76
The Pacific Islands detailed their concerns in a report to the
OECD.77 Emphasizing the sovereignty of all nations to compete in
the international financial markets, the Pacific Islands Forum
first observed that they are being forced to choose between two
to the 1998 Report, the OECD held three seminars to involve non-OECD
countries in the analysis. OECD, TOWARD GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra
note 14, at 22. These seminars brought together over thirty non-member
countries and were held in various nations throughout the world to permit
maximum participation. Id. For example, the OECD held one seminar in
Mexico to include the Latin American region and another in Turkey for the
NIS region. Id. The Asian Development Bank also had an OECD seminar in
Singapore to include the Asian region. Id. The OECD stated that these
seminars have enlightened the committee regarding the concerns of nonmember countries. Id. See also Press Statement 3601, Regional Talks on
Harmful Tax Competition, Pacific Islands Forum, to the OECD (Apr. 28,
2002), available at http://www.forumsec.org./news/2001/aprl3.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Pacific Islands Forum Press Statement]
(quoting Acting Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
Mr. Iosefa Maiava). Mr. Iosefa Maiava summarized the OECD visit when he
said, "[t]he visit to the region by OECD representatives has improved their
understanding of the vulnerable situation of these Pacific nations." Id.
72. Id. (referring to its relationship with the OECD as a "David and Goliath
standoff").
73. Id. See also Brown, supra note 7, at 314 (criticizing the OECD's Forum
report). Brown argues that the OECD fails to recognize that the developed
countries' tax regimes have harmful effects on the economies of developing
countries. Id. See also OXFAM POLICY PAPERS, supra note 13 (observing that
developing countries can hardly compete with rich countries that can afford to
offer massive subsidies and incentives).
74. Mary Swire, Pacific Nations Present United FrontAgainst OECD, TaxNews.com, at http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/story.asp?storyname=3334
(May 1, 2001).
75. Id. Eliminating the attractiveness of these financial centers would
seriously impact all sectors of their economy and their long-term economic
growth. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, 2; Murdock, supra note 37.
Developing countries which seek to be tax havens believe the "benefits of
attracting investment will offset the erosion in their tax base." OXFAM POLICY
PAPERS, supra note 13.
76. OECD, TOWARD GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, supra note 14, at 20. This
"dialogue" included the economic assistance that jurisdictions will need to
transition in the absence of tax incentives. Id. Therefore, the OECD seeks to
eliminate the ability of these economies to fairly compete because they prefer
to dis-empower these economies and have them depend on OECD Member
countries for economic support. Id.
77. See generally Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15.
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evils. 8
If they choose not to commit to the OECD's
recommendations, they face coordinated defensive measures which
will harm their economies and cause them to greatly rely upon
welfare from OECD Members.79 Conversely, if they choose to
abide by the OECD's demands, their economies will suffer because
these countries lack the ability to otherwise effectively compete for
foreign direct investment. °
In addition, the OECD treats its Members differently than
those nations listed as tax havens.8' The Pacific Island Forum
demands compensation for the business that will be lost."2 The
Forum suggested that the OECD Members use domestic defensive
measures rather than have the Pacific Islands forfeit their tax
haven status.83 For example, The Pacific Islands Forum suggested
that OECD Members standing to benefit from a lack of tax haven
competition should bear the burden of administrative costs.8
Input from all parties likely to be affected is needed to respect
each party's sovereign right to regulate its own fiscal policies. 85
The OECD, an exclusive membership of the leading industrialized
nations, is not the appropriate forum for a worldwide discussion
regarding global tax competition. 8 In my opinion, the United
Nations' policy of recognizing the needs of developing countries is
a better forum to discuss these important worldwide issues. The
United Nations is also a better forum to create a solution which
can positively affect both developed countries and especially the
developing countries.87

78. Id. 2.
79. Id.
80. See id. (stating that "the elements that make offshore tools attractive

will be removed and so cause shrinkage or closure of this sector in listed
nations.").

81. Id. I 3. The Pacific Islands Forum concluded that:
Listed nations have been treated unfavourably, both in terms of the
listing and in terms of the standards expected, compared with other
offshore financial centres and OECD Members. The substance of the
OECD-developed Memorandum of Understanding (November 2000) does
not attract the support of listed nations. It offers one-sided benefits to
OECD Members, while OECD nations with offshore financial centers
are not required to make an identical commitment.
Id. T 2.
82. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, T 4.

83. Id. 8-9.
84. See id. T18 (requesting the OECD Members bear the expenditures
necessary to "rather than being borne by the so-called 'tax havens").
85. Id. 9.
86. Id. TT 10, 12 (supporting the OECD's Global Tax forum which would
involve multiple global organizations).
87. See generally UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, J%2-4 (indicating that

the UN's report was to recommend an "institutional framework" for modernday globalized markets that would manage opportunistic tax base practices).
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IV. THE NEED TO BALANCE INVESTOR PRIVACY WITH CRIMINAL
DETERRENCE
Like globalization and sovereignty, privacy issues relate to
situations where parties on either side of a pro-privacy or proinformation exchange stand to lose money.88 If the tax authorities
seeking the exchange of information have their way, economies
which rely on the lucrative private banking business stand to lose
millions of dollars in lost customers. 9 If the pro-privacy group
maintains the status quo, however, criminals will continue to
launder money or evade taxes, and countries such as the United
States lose millions of dollars.0 Since there are legitimate reasons
to seek privacy and legitimate needs for information gathering,
both sides are justified in their arguments.
Therefore, a
compromise must be found where damages are minimized.
The following Section addresses how two OECD Members
viewed the OECD's work regarding information exchange. This
Section acknowledges that there are legitimate reasons for seeking
privacy and legitimate reasons to seek information. However, an
international standard is necessary regarding when information
gathering is appropriate and how much information can or should
be sought.
Both Luxembourg and Switzerland abstained from the
OECD's 1998 Report because the OECD advocated abolishing
bank secrecy. 9'
Due to the value of these sectors to their

88. Pacific Islands Forum Press Statement, supra note 71 (exemplifying the
discrepancy between what the Pacific Islands stand to lose as compared to
OECD Member nations).
89. Id.
90. See GAO/GGD-95-101, supra note 22, at 4 (concluding that in 1993,
"international examiners proposed adjustments to taxable income of... $900
million for 247 FCCs and $1.3 billion for 122 USCCs").
91. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 73-78 (Annex II).
See also Caccamise, supra note 4, at 554-61 (discussing various Member
comments on bank secrecy). Luxembourg did not share the OECD's view that
bank secrecy was harmful. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAx CO-OPERATION,
supra note 14, at 74. Furthermore, Luxemborg wanted the exchange of
information to be subject to precise limits equivalent to those in criminal
matters. Id. Switzerland similarly agreed that information limits are
"legitimate and necessary to protect the confidentiality of personal data." Id.
at 77. This is not surprising considering the impact Swiss private banks have
on its economy. See New Lease on Life for the Swiss Banquier Prive, supra
note 2, at 21 (describing Switzerland's private banking sector). Measured by
assets, two of Switzerland's private banks are the largest in the world. Id.
UBS is the largest bank with Credit Suisse coming in third. Id. The private
banking sectors of these banks are highly profitable. Id. Both UBS and
Credit Suisse "earn more than half of their entire profits from their private
banking arms." Id. Regarding the OECD's efforts to combat tax havens, a
Swiss banker stated:
Private banks operating in tax havens are under pressure to increase
transparency and liaise better with global tax authorities. This can be
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These two

countries, among others, believe "[tihe right to personal
confidentiality is one of the keys to democracies" and they will
seek to protect that right.93
Not all offshore account holders are criminals.94 A legitimate
reason to seek privacy is a desire to protect assets from an
unstable government's confiscation or from frivolous alleged
creditors.99 Another legitimate reason to seek privacy may be to
keep information from competitors or non-governmental
organizations which feel that "too much profit is itself evidence of
exploitation."96 In spite of these lawful reasons, multinationals as
well as citizens must give up some of that privacy to protect their
economies."
Freedoms are limited to protect society from harm.98 For
example, in the United States we are granted the right of free
speech.99 However, we are unable to use "fighting words" because
some speech is harmful. 109 Similarly, we are free to enter into
contracts for any subject matter ... as long as that subject matter

is legal. This limitation is designed to protect us from harmful
contracts, such as contracts to kill. Is it not then appropriate to
seen as an opportunity and a threat. Clearly, account holders seeking
privacy may well be discouraged, but, equally, higher standards and
regulation will attract legitimate investors and make them feel more
comfortable.
Id.
92. See Pacific Islands Forum Press Statement, supra note 71 (comparing
the miniscule tax base losses that OECD Member nations suffer compared to
what the Pacific Islands could potentially suffer to emphasize the value of
offshore centers to the Pacific Islands).
93. See New Lease on Life for the Swiss BanquierPrive, supra note 2, at 21.
94. Terence Corcoran, Know Your Regulators!: Offshore Account Probe is
Another Twisted Venture, FIN. POST: EDITORIAL, Oct. 18, 2001, at 15, available
at 2001 WL 28026420.
95. Larkins, supra note 4, at 478-79.
See also J. Alex Tarquinio,
Squirreling
Your
Money
Abroad,
Forbes.com,
at
http://forbes.com/2000/01/08/feat.html (last modified Jan. 8, 2000) (citing asset
protection as a reason to seek a private offshore account). For example, when
a seller sells a corporation, the seller has to make numerous representations
and warranties. Id. After the buyer has bankrupted the company within a
year, the buyer wants his or her money back. Id. The seller's profit from the
sale would be protected if he or she had put it in an offshore trust. Id.
96. Larkins, supra note 4, at 478-79 (listing some tax havens which have
confidentiality laws, including "Anguilla, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Panama and Vanuatu").
97. See Dorgan, supra note 22, at 35 (concluding that transfer pricing
drains the United States' economy).
98. Pacific Islands Forum, supra note 15, 1 6, 12.
99. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1991).
100. See id. at 382 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)) (defining fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace").
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limit privacy to prevent harm? '°'
As a child I was taught a test to determine if I was doing
something right or wrong. If the whole world found out about
what I contemplated doing, could I still be proud about it? This
test kept me out of trouble numerous times, just as investigative
journalism surely makes those who would otherwise deceive us
hesitate, if only for a moment.
This glare of the public eye is used as a criminal deterrent in
numerous situations.
For example, consider the reporting
requirements in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or many
environmental treaties in which pollution levels are published for
all to see.' °2 This is part of what the OECD is trying to accomplish
when it publishes a list of tax havens. For example, the OECD's
1998 Report correctly states that "[b]ecause non-transparent
administrative practices as well as an inability or unwillingness to
provide information not only allow investors to avoid their taxes
but also facilitate illegal activities, such as tax evasion and money
laundering, these factors are particularly troublesome."1 °3
To facilitate information gathering to deter criminal activity,
investment brokers are subject to a "know-your-client" rule.0 4
"[T]he most fundamental obligation of brokers is to ensure they
have sufficient knowledge of their clients' affairs in order to act in
their best interests. Implicit in this basic tenet is that brokers are
required to uphold the integrity of the capital markets."' 5° The
challenge is that no uniform regulations currently exist regarding
just how much information an investment firm is expected to know
about offshore clients in highly secretive jurisdictions.' 0
Therefore, those seeking to maintain their privacy-related
101. But see Murdock, supra note 37 (quoting Heritage Foundation fiscal
policy analyst Dan Mitchell: "[i]f you repealed the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, you could reduce crime, but it wouldn't be worth the cost to
individual liberty.").
102. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Lacey, Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal
Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y,
119, 120-21 (explaining that Congress included accounting provisions
requiring accurate and clear representation of expenses in an attempt to
combat bribery and other foreign corrupt practices).
103. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 5, at 24. The use of
privacy to evade taxes is common. For example, privacy-bulletin.com's slogan
says "Offshore Banking: Get your money out of the country before your
country gets the money out of you." E-commerce Solutions, Privacy Bulletin Categories, at http://www.privacy-bulletin.com/ecommerce (last visited Feb.
14, 2002).
104. Tedesco, supra note 21, at 1.
105. Id. But see Corcoran, supra note 94, at 15 (arguing that the "knowyour-client rule is to protect investors from incompetent and manipulative
brokers"). If Mr. Corcoran's analysis of the "know-your-client" rule is correct,
it seems that the title of the rule is a misnomer.
106. Tedesco, supra note 21, at 1.
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business profits will likely be less inclined to interpret the rule
broadly.
Numerous efforts are in progress to enable tax authorities to
gain the information needed to enforce their laws. 10 7 Emphasis
needs to be placed on the need to maintain sovereignty. 8 Courts
are challenged by this as exhibited in the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals case of United States v. FirstNational Bank of Chicago. 109
In First National, the IRS requested information regarding
records at their Greek branch regarding a Greek bank account.1 °
First National's bank employees in Greece could not comply
because Greek bank secrecy laws subjected them to six months in
prison for disclosing any personal information. 1 ' The issue was
whether First National should be compelled to comply with the
discovery order despite Greek laws subjecting bank employees to a
jail term."' The court stated that "[tihe fact that foreign law may
subject a person to criminal sanctions in the foreign country if he
produces certain information does not automatically bar a
domestic court from compelling production.""' Rather, Section 40
of the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law entitled
"Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction" provides a
guiding analysis:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of
law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international
law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its
enforcement jurisdiction, in light of such factors as
(a) vital national interest of each of the states,

107. See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,

opened for signature Jan. 25, 1988, Europ. T.S. No. 127, 1988 U.S.T. Lexis 193,
195 (explaining that the Treaty's purpose is to create an atmosphere of
international cooperation while countries retain both sovereignty and selfdetermined legislation).

108. This is challenging. In St. Vincent, for example, the policy is to not
provide information until someone is indicted. Fields, supra note 4, at 1C.
Western authorities, however, must first get information on offshore accounts

before they can indict someone. Id.
109. Caccamise, Jr., supra note 4, at 567-68 (citing United States v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983)). In First National, the
court concluded that "a foreign interest in bank secrecy laws is not superseded

by the domestic interest in the enforcement of tax law" under Section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law. Id. at 568; FirstNat'l, 699 F.2d

at 345.
110. First Nat'l, 699 F.2d at 342.

111. See id. (commenting that First National's employees' prospective prison
terms were not convertible into a fine).
112. Id. at 343.
113. Id. at 345 (citing In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977)).
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(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by that state."'
Applying these factors, the court held that both the IRS and
Greece had interests that required remanding for further
proceedings." 5 The court suggested that First National attempt to
obtain Greece's permission to provide the information requested. 1 6
It reasoned that "[a]lthough the interest of the United States in
collecting taxes is of importance to the financial integrity of the
nation, the interest of Greece, served by its bank secrecy law is
also important ..

1,.7

A subsequent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case
acknowledged the difficulty in balancing the interests of a foreign
jurisdiction with domestic interests." 8 "[T]he judiciary has little
expertise, or perhaps even authority to evaluate the economic and
social policies of a foreign country.""9 However, in tax cases where
the United States is a party, the national interest is compelling. 2 °
Even assuming the domestic interest is more compelling, one
needs to consider the resources of the other state to assist with
compliance.12'
With concepts as difficult as transfer pricing,
compliance
efforts
are very costly for both the corporation and the
22
IRS.'

114. Id. at 346.
115. FirstNat'l, 699 F.2d at 346.
116. Id.
117. Id. Although there was a bilateral tax treaty between the United
States and Greece, the court did not render an opinion regarding its effect on
the case. Id.
118. Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat
(Administration of State Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990).
119. Id. (quoting Judge Marshall from In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480
F.Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979)).
120. Id.
121. See UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17, T 21. "[Tlhere are perceptible
differences in the ability of developed and developing countries to obtain and
provide required information to a treaty partner. The developed countries
need to provide information and assistance to developing countries to enable
them to carry out exchange of information procedures at an affordable cost."
Id.
122. See VOLPE, supra note 5 (stating that "[1]arger US businesses pay $1.33
on tax compliance for each dollar sent to the federal government."). See also
GAO/GGD-94-96FS, supra note 22, at 3 (describing that the IRS increased
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In summary, though privacy interests are important, the
interest in deterring criminal behavior is equally important. The
court in First National indicated that criminal matters were
subject to a different standard than tax matters." 3 While there are
more issues when personal liberty is involved, tax evasion is a
crime and the same standard should be applied to the discovery of
information due to its criminal nature.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A MORE GLOBAL FORUM
To avoid the sovereignty issues caused by a small group of
industrialized nations applying peer pressure to a large group of
very small developing countries, I propose a forum other than the
OECD to address issues related to tax havens. 4 While the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) has recently addressed a tax incentive,
the WTO generally is not an appropriate body to address the issue
because its focus is retroactive and case-specific. For example, the
WTO found the Foreign Sales Corporation to be in violation of the
WTO as an export subsidy. Also, its enforcement is limited to a
limited number of members.
A better forum to address international tax matters
proactively is the United Nations. Significantly, "nearly every
nation in the world belongs to the UN." 2' The United Nations
emphasizes the sovereignty of its members and states that "all the
Member States - large and small, rich and poor, with differing
political views and social systems - have a voice and vote in this
process." 26 This global presence would encourage the cooperation
necessary to effectively address international tax related issues
while maintaining the sovereignty rights of all who would be
affected.
The United Nations organ that addresses tax issues is the
Economic and Social Council, which is headquartered in New
"
York. 27
'
The Council has already begun work regarding the
important area of international economic issues.' "As the central
forum for discussing international economic and social issues and
for formulating policy recommendations, the Council plays a key

their staff to enforce "international tax compliance" laws).
123. First Nat'l, 699 F.2d at 345.
124. OECD,
About

OECD,

at

http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral (last visited Feb. 15,
2002) (stating that "[d]ialogue, consensus and peer pressure are at the very
heart of OECD.") (emphasis added).
125. See U.N., The UN in Brief- How the UN Works, at
http://www.un.orgOverview/brief.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002) (declaring

that 189 countries are Members). Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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role in fostering international cooperation for development." 129 The
Council has fifty-four members with leadership from Croatia,
Guatemala, Finland, Bahrain and South Africa.'
In the years
1998 and 1999, the United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters met to discuss issues
such as transfer pricing, exchange of information and tax
treaties. 3 '
Like the OECD, the United Nations views tax havens as a
"threat."32 The United Nations also defines a tax haven similarly
to the OECD.'33 According to the United Nations, a tax haven is a
country with a "[]ow or zero effective tax rate; [an unwillingness
to share information; [a] lack of transparency; absence of real
business activity; [and] a special regime clearly demarcated from
the domestic economy.,134
However, the United Nations differs from the OECD in some
important areas. For example, the United Nations views the tax
haven issue as a "cooperative effort between developed and
developing countries and transitional economy countries."1 3 5 Also,
the United Nations does not consider developing countries offering
incentives leading to a low effective tax rate to be tax havens. 36
Regarding exchange of information, the United Nations has a
more realistic viewpoint than the OECD:
[TIax haven countries flourished primarily because of their
insistence on non-disclosure of information to the countries of
residence of taxpayers who used the facilities offered by tax havens.
Such tax haven countries were not likely to enter into bilateral tax
treaties with non-tax haven countries with provisions of exchange of
information since their own existence as a tax haven would then be
at stake. It was also noted that developed countries with their
greater economic power and highly developed legal systems were in
129. U.N.,

The

UN

in

Brief:

How

the

UN

Works,

at

http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.html.
130. U.N., United Nations Economic and Social Council, Members, at
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc/members.htm (last visited Feb. 4,
2002) (listing the fifty-four Members); U.N., United Nations Economic and
Social Council, Welcome, at http://www.un.org.esa/coordination/ecosoc/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2002) (listing members of the UN's leadership team).
131. See UN Ninth Meeting, supra note 17,
2-4, (stating that the purpose
of their meeting was to "explore" methods to curtail "unfair tax competition");
Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on InternationalCooperation
in Tax Matters:Report of the Secretary General, U.N. ESCOR, 1998 Sess., 8th

mtg., Agenda Item 13 (d), T 2-3, U.N. Doc. E/1998/100 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/esosoc/docs/1998/e1998-57.htm [hereinafter UN
Eighth Meeting] (stating that the purpose of the meeting was to resolve world
wide tax evasion and double-taxation issues).
132. UN Eighth Meeting, supra note 131, 10.
133. Id. 12.
134. Id.
135. Id. 9110.
136. Id. 9 13.
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a better position, compared with
the majority of developing
137
countries, to deal with tax havens.
Rather than using coordinated defense measures against tax
havens, the United Nations seeks to empower nations by offering
training to tax administrators of transitional and developing
economies.8
This training includes "practical methods and
strategies for combating tax evasion" and gives "tax
administrators" the opportunity to discuss their own tax
systems. 39
The United Nations' proposed solution greatly resembles the
OECD's solution because it pressures tax havens to exchange more
information for crime prevention."40 However, the United Nations
is approaching this with a more realistic point of view as a result
of a true open dialogue with its expansive group of Members.
Taxpayers can no longer be expected to stay within borders like
cows to be milked. However, if enough people contribute to an
open discussion, a fair allocation of the tax burden can be reached
while still supporting globalization. National sovereignty can be
maintained and the right to privacy can be balanced with the need
to deter criminal conduct.

137.
138.
139.
140.

UN Eighth Meeting, supra note 131,
Id. 43.
Id.
Id. 46.
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